We suggest a certain minimal approach to the historical Socrates on the basis of Plato’s Apology. This text makes it possible to reconstruct the authentic charge and the defense line of Socrates, as well as his motivation and the quintessence of his philosophical challenge. The most important thing is what the philosopher says in the face of his death sentence: that the greatest good for a man is to live an examined life focusing on virtues and ethical values. Unfortunately, the (...) preponderance of studies, even the most recent ones, fail to recognize the philosopher’s provocative challenge, whilst it is not only a crucial motif in the Socratic examining, i.e. testing the interlocutors’ knowledge by means of irony, elenchos and aporia, but also an inspiration for his direct and indirect followers in seeking virtues and the greatest good. (shrink)

Grapheme-color synesthetes experience color, not physically present, when viewing symbols. Synesthetes cannot remember learning these associations. Must synesthetic percepts be formed during a sensitive period? Can they form later and be consistent? What determines their nature? We tested grapheme-color synesthete, MC2, before, during and after she studied Hindi abroad. We investigated whether novel graphemes elicited synesthetic percepts, changed with familiarity, and/or benefited from phonemic information. MC2 reported color percepts to novel Devanagari and Hebrew graphemes. MC2 monitored these percepts over 6 (...) months in a Hindi-speaking environment. MC2 and synesthete DN, reported synesthetic percepts for Armenian graphemes, or Cyrillic graphemes + phonemes over time. Synesthetes, not controls, reported color percepts for novel graphemes that gained consistency over time. Phonemic information did not enhance consistency. Thus, synesthetes can form and consolidate percepts to novel graphemes as adults. These percepts may depend on pre-existing grapheme-color relationships but they can flexibly shift with familiarity. (shrink)

Strategic games require reasoning about other people’s and one’s own beliefs or intentions. Although they have clear commonalities with psychological tests of theory of mind, they are not clearly related to theory of mind tests for children between 9 and 10 years of age “Flobbe et al. J Logic Language Inform 17(4):417–442 (2008)”. We studied children’s (5–12 years of age) individual differences in how they played a strategic game by analyzing the strategies that they applied in a zero, first, and (...) second-order reasoning task. For the zero-order task, we found two subgroups with different accuracy levels. For the first-order task, subgroups of children applied different suboptimal strategies or an optimal strategy. For the second-order task only suboptimal strategies were present. Strategy use for all tasks was related to age. The 5- and 6-year old children were additionally tested on theory of mind understanding and executive functioning. Strategy-use in these children was related to working memory, but not to theory of mind after correction for age, verbal ability and general IQ. (shrink)

The Metaphysical Club, a gathering of intellectuals in the 1870s associated with Harvard, is widely recognized as the crucible where pragmatism, America's distinctively original philosophy, was refined and proclaimed. Louis Menand's bestseller about the group was a dramatic publishing success. However, only three actual members - Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., Charles S. Peirce, and William James - appear in this book, alongside other thinkers such as John Dewey who were never in the Club. The Real Metaphysical Club tells the full (...) story of how this influential group shifted the course of philosophy in America. In addition to pioneering pragmatism, the group explored radical empiricism and idealism, and formulated personalism and process philosophy, equally important developments. This volume contains thirty-seven important writings dating from 1870 to 1885 by the real members of the Metaphysical Club. The first section centers on pragmatism and science; the second part collects writings of the lawyers; and the third part covers idealist and personalist philosophers. Many of these writings have never been reprinted before, and nothing like this impressive collection has ever been attempted. A general introduction provides a narrative history, and the editors' three introductions to the volume's sections vividly bring to life the intense meetings, sustained debates, and pioneering thought from the Metaphysical Club. (shrink)

Elliott Sober''s selection for/selection of distinction has been widely used to clarify the idea that some properties of organisms are side-effects of selection processes. It has also been used, however, to choose between different descriptions of an evolutionary product when assigning biological functions to that product. We suggest that there is a characteristic error in these uses of the distinction. Complementary descriptions of function are misrepresented as mutually excluding one another. This error arises from a failure to appreciate that selection (...) processes can be described at several different theoretical levels. (shrink)

Strategic games require reasoning about other people’s and one’s own beliefs or intentions. Although they have clear commonalities with psychological tests of theory of mind, they are not clearly related to theory of mind tests for children between 9 and 10 years of age “Flobbe et al. J Logic Language Inform 17(4):417–442 (2008)”. We studied children’s (5–12 years of age) individual differences in how they played a strategic game by analyzing the strategies that they applied in a zero, first, and (...) second-order reasoning task. For the zero-order task, we found two subgroups with different accuracy levels. For the first-order task, subgroups of children applied different suboptimal strategies or an optimal strategy. For the second-order task only suboptimal strategies were present. Strategy use for all tasks was related to age. The 5- and 6-year old children were additionally tested on theory of mind understanding and executive functioning. Strategy-use in these children was related to working memory, but not to theory of mind after correction for age, verbal ability and general IQ. (shrink)

Conceptualized within the framework of self-determination theory, the aim of the current study was to investigate the relation between perfectionistic concerns and (a) controlled (non-self-determined) motivation and (b) performance anxiety through basic psychological need frustration (frustration of competence, autonomy, and realtedness), and if these relations would be moderated by controlling teaching/coaching conditions. We used a cross-sectional moderated mediation design and purposefully selected Norwegian elite junior performers (N = 171; Mage = 17.3; SDage= 0.94) from talent development schools, who completed an (...) online questionnaire to report their perceptions of the study variables. Associations were examined using structural equation modeling. The results showed that perfectionistic concerns were positively associated with controlling conditions, basic needs frustration, controlled motivation, and performance anxiety. Reported controlling teaching/coaching conditions moderated the positive indirect relationship between perfectionistic concerns and (a) controlled motivation and (b) performance anxiety through competence need frustration. Specifically, these indirect associations were evident for performers reporting moderate or high levels of controlling teaching/coaching conditions. In contrast, there were no indirect associations via competence need frustration for those performers who reported low levels of controlling conditions. In conclusion, the results indicate that perfectionistic concerns appear to be a vulnerability factor that exposes elite junior performers to higher risks of entering a debilitative motivational process. This seems especially likely when exposed to controlling teaching/coaching conditions. Coaches and teachers working with elite junior performers should avoid using controlling mechanisms and instead foster autonomous functioning. (shrink)

Narrowly speaking, the correspondence theory of truth is the view that truth is correspondence to a fact -- a view that was advocated by Russell and Moore early in the 20 th century. But the label is usually applied much more broadly to any view explicitly embracing the idea that truth consists in a relation to reality, i.e., that truth is a relational property involving a characteristic relation (to be specified) to some portion of reality (to be specified). During the (...) last 2300 years this basic idea has been expressed in many ways, resulting in a rather extended family of views, theories, and theory sketches. The members of the family employ various concepts for the relevant relation (correspondence, conformity, congruence, agreement, accordance, copying, picturing, signification, representation, reference, satisfaction) and/or various concepts for the relevant portion of reality (facts, states of affairs, situations, events, objects, sequences of objects, sets, properties, tropes). The resulting multiplicity of versions and reformulations of the theory is due to a blend of substantive and terminological differences. (shrink)

No livro I da Ethica Eudemia, Aristóteles dedica um capítulo a considerações acerca de seu método. No entanto, analisando passagens de outros tratados do autor, é possível concluir que há algo comum que perpassa as diversas considerações acerca de seu método, a saber: que o ponto de partida de toda investigação é dado pelo que é mais cognoscível a nós, e todo o procedimento de investigação visa chegar ao que é mais cognoscível em si mesmo – o conhecimento estrito do (...) objeto, que inclui compreender suas causas. O objetivo deste trabalho é tentar compreender como esse procedimento acontece na investigação moral, que opera no âmbito do discurso e, portanto, das definições. Para isso, pretendemos analisar como acontece a passagem da análise do que é dado na experiência em direção ao conhecimento de suas causas, que é próprio de outros tratados aristotélicos, para a análise das opiniões vagas e imprecisas em direção às definições estritas com as quais a Ethica Eudemia pretende operar. (shrink)

Support from grandparents plays a role in mothers’ perinatal mental health. However, previous research on maternal mental health has mainly focused on influences of partner support or general social support and neglected the roles of grandparents. In this narrative review and meta-analysis, the scientific evidence on the association between grandparental support and maternal perinatal mental health is reviewed. Searches in PubMed, EMBASE, MEDLINE, Scopus, and PsycINFO yielded 11 empirical studies on N = 3381 participants, reporting on 35 effect sizes. A (...) multilevel approach to meta-analysis was applied to test the association between grandparental support and maternal mental health. The results showed a small, statistically significant association (r =.16; 95% CI: 0.09–0.25). A moderator test indicated that the association was stronger for studies reporting on support from the maternal grandmother in particular (r =.23; 95% CI: 0.06–0.29). Our findings suggest that involved grandparents, in particular mother’s own mother, constitute a protective factor for the development of maternal postpartum mental health problems. These findings have clear implications for interventions. Future studies should examine whether stimulating high-quality support from grandparents is a fruitful avenue for enhancing maternal postpartum mental health. (shrink)

David Wallace has recently argued that the eigenstate–eigenvalue (E–E) link has no place in serious discussions of quantum mechanics on the grounds that, as he claims, the E–E link is an invention of philosophers rather than the community of practicing physicists. This raises an historical question regarding the origin of the link. This paper aims to answer this question by tracing the historical development of the link through six key textbooks of quantum mechanics. In light of the historical evidence from (...) these textbooks, it is argued that Wallace provides insufficient grounds for dismissing the E–E link from discussions of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Fifty years later it is still necessary to talk about some decisions of Second Vatican Ecumenical Council regarding the role of the layperson as the Church's mission participant and also its fundamental role concerning the dialogue between Church and the world, as discussed throughout the Council and singularly in the Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes. It can be seen throughout history that the layman, somewhat, could see himself forgotten, taking part in the Church passively. This thought, however, is changing from (...) what was said at the Council as its several documents show: the layman as a transforming agent in the Church but, more essencially, out of it, it is recognized its important role as participants in the mission. So we talk about the Mission of the Church and the Council contributions to this new understanding of the laity, the role of the layperson in the Church, the importance of dialogue between the Church and the world and finally, the layman as the main agent in this dialogue. (shrink)

It is sometimes argued that contextualism cannot explain (dis)agreements concerning matters of personal taste because it treats sentences involving predicates of taste as indexical. I aim to weaken this charge. Given the idea that people sometimes use indexical sentences to express (dis)agreements about taste, two kinds of (dis)agreement are distinguished, namely doxastic and non-doxastic. Taste (dis)agreements are better explained in terms of the later kind, in which case they become amenable to contextualist treatment. It is argued that if something instantiates (...) a taste property (like being tasty for A), it has to instantiate a corresponding attitudinal property (like being liked by A). Based on this, utterances of taste sentences express propositions that concern tastiness of something (e.g., that X is tasty for A) and these propositions entail other propositions that concern non-doxastic attitudes the speakers bear toward something (e.g., that X is liked by A). One speaker is claimed to (dis)agree with another speaker provided their respective entailed propositions feature (in)compatible non-doxastic attitudes. Although this explanation is similar to hybrid accounts that are currently growing in popularity, it departs from them in some notable respects. (shrink)

As to the preference which most people—as long as they are not annoyed by instances—feel in favor of true propositions, this must be based, apparently, upon an ultimate ethical proposition: ‘It is good to believe true propositions, and bad to believe false ones’. This proposition, it is to be hoped, is true; but if it is not, there is no reason to think that we do ill in believing it. Bertrand Russell, “Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions” (1904).

To study animal welfare empirically we need an objective basis for deciding when an animal is suffering. Suffering includes a wide range ofunpleasant emotional states such as fear, boredom, pain, and hunger. Suffering has evolved as a mechanism for avoiding sources ofdanger and threats to fitness. Captive animals often suffer in situations in which they are prevented from doing something that they are highly motivated to do. The an animal is prepared to pay to attain or to escape a situation (...) is an index ofhow the animal about that situation. Withholding conditions or commodities for which an animal shows (i.e., for which it continues to work despite increasing costs) is very likely to cause suffering. In designing environments for animals in zoos, farms, and laboratories, priority should be given to features for which animals show inelastic demand. The care ofanimals can thereby be based on an objective, animal-centered assessment of their needs. (shrink)

In the Netherlands there is a growing debate over the possibility of introducting ‘compassionate interference’ as a form of good psychiatric care. Instead of respecting the autonomy of the patient by adopting an attitude of non‐interference, professional carers should take a more active and commited role. There was a great deal of hostile reaction to this suggestion, the most commonly voiced criticism being that it smacked of ‘modern paternalism’. Still, the current conception of care leaves us with a paradox. On (...) the one hand patients are regarded as individuals who have a strong interest in ( and a right to) freedom and non‐interference; on the other hand many of them have a desperate need for flourishing, viable relationships. In fact, part of their problem is that they cannot relate very well with other people. This creates a dichotomy, because respecting patients' autonomy often means that they cannot be given the help they so desperately need. In this respect current care practices do not answer the caring needs of these patients.The criticism on care practices is to be considerd as important. It invites us to reexamine and reevaluate the current conception of caring relationships and its main values. In line with this reexamination an alternative perspective on care is introduced in this paper, a perspective in which `compassionate interference' is not so much a threat to autonomy, but a means of attaining autonomy. For this we need a different definition of autonomy than that commonly used in current care practice. (shrink)

Inhaltsverzeichnis/Table of Contents Themenschwerpunkt/Special Topic: Bolzano & Kant Gastherausgeber/Guest Editor: Sandra Lapointe Sandra Lapointe: Introduction Sandra Lapointe: Is Logic Formal? Bolzano, Kant and the Kantian Logicians Nicholas F. Stang: A Kantian Reply to Bolzano¿s Critique of Kant¿s Analytic-Synthetic Distinction Clinton Tolley: Bolzano and Kant on the Place of Subjectivity in a Wissenschaftslehre Timothy Rosenkoetter: Kant and Bolzano on the Singularity of Intuitions Waldemar Rohloff: From Ordinary Language to Definition in Kant and Bolzano Weitere Artikel/Further Articles Christian Damböck: Wilhelm Diltheys empirische (...) Philosophie und der rezente Methodenstreit in der analytischen Philosophie Bernd Prien: Socially Constituted Actions and Objects Daniel Enrique Kalpokas: Two Dogmas of Coherentism Jon Cogburn & Jeff W. Roland: Strong, therefore Sensitive. Misgivings about DeRose¿s Contextualism Andre Abath: Brewer¿s Switching Argument Essay-Wettbewerb/Essay Competition Amadeus Magrabi: The Value of Feelings for Decision-Making Stefan Reining: Do Pain-Accompanying Emotions Mislead Us?¿Considerations in the Light of Reactive Dissociation Phenomena Peter Königs: Patriotism. A Case Study in the Philosophy of Emotions Besprechungsaufsatz/Review Essay Christopher Gauker: What Do Your Senses Say? On Burge¿s Theory of Perception Diskussion/Discussion Georg Brun: Adequate Formalization and De Morgan¿s Argument Buchnotizen/Critical Notes. (shrink)

O presente artigo visa defender a tese de que há dois tipos diferentes de métodos nas éticas de Aristóteles. Costumeiramente, as prescrições metodológicas de EN VII 1 e EE I 6 são vistas como complementares, fazendo parte de um mesmo método que fora descrito por Barnes como o “método dos endoxa”. Esse método, claramente presente na prescrição da EN, consiste em estabelecer os phainomena, percorrer as aporias e provar o que for possível das opiniões reputadas. Contudo, o método que é (...) prescrito em EE I 6 parte da noção de “passar do mais vago ao mais preciso” utilizando os phainomena como indícios e modelos. Defenderemos aqui que a noção de phainomena, embora apareça nas duas prescrições, tem papéis e escopos diferentes em cada um dos métodos, de onde surge sua diferença. Para isso, analisaremos a prescrição de EN VII 1 juntamente ao assim chamado “método dos endoxa”, em seguida partiremos para a análise da prescrição de EE I 6 e, por fim, analisaremos detalhadamente a diferença entre essas duas prescrições. (shrink)

As cardiopatias congênitas são caracterizadas por anormalidade na estrutura cardiovascular, presente desde a vida fetal, sendo estimados 30 mil casos por ano, no Brasil. Apresentam alta taxa de mortalidade, requerendo, muitas vezes, hospitalizações, intervenções e cirurgias. É necessário atentar para necessidades das figuras maternas e paternas e suas formas de enfrentamento, pois fazem parte do suporte na recuperação da criança. Este estudo transversal objetivou identificar as estratégias de enfrentamento adotadas pelos pais, durante a hospitalização da criança, verificar se existe diferença (...) entre os gêneros. Foram avaliados 20 cuidadores, em acompanhamento ao filho hospitalizado para tratamento de cardiopatia congênita. Responderam questionário sociodemográfico e Escala de Enfrentamento de Problemas. Verificou-se que não há diferença na adoção de estratégias entre cuidadores materno e paterno, entretanto observou-se correlação entre fatores sociodemográficos e predominância do enfrentamento focado no problema e religiosidade. (shrink)

The paper offers some preliminary and rather unsystematic reflections about the question: Do Beliefs Have Their Contents Essentially? The question looks like it ought to be important, yet it is rarely discussed. Maybe that’s because content essentialism, i.e., the view that beliefs do have their contents essentially, is simply too obviously and trivially true to deserve much discussion. I sketch a common-sense argument that might be taken to show that content essentialism is indeed utterly obvious and/or trivial. Somewhat against this, (...) I then point out that a “sexy” conclusion that is sometimes drawn from Putnam-Burge-style externalist arguments, namely that our mental states are not in our heads, presupposes content essentialism — which suggests that the view is not entirely trivial. Moreover, it seems intuitively that physicalists should reject the view: If beliefs are physical states, how could they have their propositional contents essentially? I distinguish three readings of the title question. Content essentialism does seem fairly obvious on the first two, but not so on the third. I argue that the common-sense argument mentioned earlier presupposes one of the first two readings but fails to apply to the third, on which ‘belief’ refers to belief-state tokens. That’s because ordinary belief individuation is silent about belief-state tokens. Token physicalists, I suggest, should indeed reject content essentialism about belief-state tokens. What about token dualists? One might think they ought to embrace content essentialism about belief-state tokens. I end with puzzling why this should be so. (shrink)

What is animal welfare? Why has it proved so difficult to find a definition that everyone can agree on? This concise and accessible guide is for anyone who is interested in animals and who has wondered how we can assess their welfare scientifically. It defines animal welfare as 'health and animals having what they want', a definition that can be easily understood by scientists and non-scientists alike, expresses in simple words what underlies many existing definitions, and shows what evidence we (...) need to collect to improve animal welfare in practice. Above all, it puts the animal's own point of view at the heart of an assessment of its welfare. But, can we really understand what animals want? A consistent theme running through the book is that not only is it possible to establish what animals want, but that this information is vital in helping us to make sense of the long and often confusing list of welfare measures that are now in use such as 'stress' and 'feel good hormones', expressive sounds and gestures, natural behaviour, cognitive bias, and stereotypies. Defining welfare as 'health and what animals want' allows us to distinguish between measures that are simply what an animal does when it is alert, aroused, or active and those measures that genuinely allow us to distinguish between situations the animals themselves see as positive or negative. Sentience (conscious feelings of pleasure, pain, and suffering) is for many people the essence of what is meant by welfare, but studying consciousness is notoriously difficult, particularly in non-human species. These difficulties are discussed in the context of our current - and as yet incomplete - knowledge of human and animal consciousness. Finally, the book highlights some key ideas in the relationship between animal welfare science and animal ethics and shows how closely the well-being of humans is linked to that of other animals. The Science of Animal Welfare is an ideal companion for undergraduate and graduate students taking courses in animal behaviour and welfare, as well as for professional researchers, practitioners and animal welfare consultants. At the same time, it is easily understandable to non-scientists and anyone without prior knowledge but with an interest in animals and the rapidly evolving science of animal welfare. (shrink)

Ancient Platonists and Aristotelians considered the heuristic method of reasoning to first principles as “analysis.” It was derived from Greek geometrical practice. Plato’s theory of first principles, as we reconstruct it following Aristotle, postulated such an “analytic system.” In this system both sensible things and mathematical objects, ideas and eidetic numbers are gradually reduced to the same principles (ἕν – μέγα – μικρόν). In the reversal order, from the principles are genetically elicited eidetic numbers and through them numbers, mathematical objects, (...) and sensible things. This is a great analytical system that in fact has a mathematical structure. It transcends the physical explanation of the Timaios and is a broad translation of the nature of things. Our considerations concern a reconstruction and debatable issues, and they follow the following topics: 1. Testimonia Platonica, 2. Analytic theory of principles and agrapha dogmata, 3. Contextual problem and the field of agrapha dogmata, 4. The construction of a system: a procedure from and toward the principles, 5. The alleged paradox: “Good – One.” Ethics or mathematics? 6. Written and unwritten dogmata: dialogue or system? (shrink)